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I. Criminal Corporate Liability: The Corrupt Agent and the
Foreign Official
Consider a case in which a British agent, hired by the English branch of a
United States (U.S.) corporation, bribes an official in Nigeria to facilitate an
investment there.' This bribe violates the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) in the U.S.,2 the 2010 Bribery Act in the United Kingdom (U.K.),3
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1. This hypothetical case is loosely based on the facts of the TSKJ/Bonny Island
prosecutions, in which a conglomerate of multinational corporations engaged in a scheme to
bribe the Nigerian government into awarding contracts to develop liquefied natural gas
infrastructure. A British agent of Kellogg, Brown, & Root (KBR)-a U.S. company
participated in part of the scheme. In the actual case, the KBR CEO plead guilty to conspiring
to violate the FCPA; this hypothetical omits this fact and assumes that the CEO was unaware of
the agent's violation and must decide how to respond. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (July 7, 2010), http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/snamprogetti-netherlands-bv-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-
investigation-and-agrees for factual background; see Jay Holtmeier, Fighting Corruption in
America and Abroad Cross-Border Corruption Enforcement: A Case for Measured
Coordination Among Multiple Enforcement Authorities, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 493, 498 and n.
30, discussing the case.
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 § 1494 (codified at 15 USC
§ 78dd-1 et seq. (1977)), available at http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/95/213.pdf. (The U.S.
can assert jurisdiction even though no U.S. person acted, and all acts were performed outside
the U.S.); see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATEs ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-28.210 (1999)
(citing United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (the test to determine if an agent
has acted within the scope of his employment is "whether the agent is performing acts of the
kind which he is authorized to perform, and those acts are motivated, at least in part, by an
intent to benefit the corporation."); United States v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770
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and Nigerian Anti-Corruption Laws.4 The CEO asks the General Counsel
first to determine the sum of the penalties the corporation could face, and
second, to give advice on how to minimize the company's exposure to these
penalties. If the corporation discloses the violation and helps investigators, it
may reduce liability in the U.S. and U.K., but may expose itself to multiple
prosecutions, and increased aggregate liability. Should it, therefore,
remediate internally, avoid disclosure, and contest criminal charges if
necessary? Doing so would be contrary to the policies of the FCPA, the
U.K.'s Bribery Law, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's
(OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention.5
I first show in this article that, given the severe penalties and likelihood of
detection, many corporations will voluntary disclose international corrupt
acts because states will impose lighter sentences in exchange. But states
reward corporations only in exchange for significant disclosures of
information, and the international agreements between the U.S., U.K., and
Nigeria obligate each state to share such information. Consequently,
corporations who voluntarily disclose information expose themselves to
greater risk of multiple settlements or prosecutions. Against this backdrop
of conflicting incentives to disclose or withhold, and amidst a flurry of
conflicting precedents, I turn to the empirical data, which suggest that
voluntary disclosure does not help the corporation; further, multi-state
investigations are correlated with increased corporate corruption penalties.
Finally, I suggest how international policymakers could better align
corporate self-reporting incentives and broader international policy goals.
II. The Maximum Penalties are Severe
Corporate controls have failed and the corrupt act is consummated. The
CEO must now consider the worst-case scenario, and determine how to
mitigate it. The corporation could face monetary penalties and collateral
consequences including revoked licenses and loss of eligibility for contracts,
loans, or benefits.6 Fines could reach 700 percent of the benefit obtained by
F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Old Monastery Co. v. United
States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945) (An actual benefit to the corporation is not
prerequisite to liability: benefit is not a "touchstone of criminal corporate liability; benefit at
best is an evidential, not an operative, fact.")).
3. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 § 6-8 (U.K.), www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/
introduction; see also Lee G. Dunst et al., Hot off the Press: Resetting the Global Anti-Corruption
Thermostat to the UK Bribery Act, 12 Bus. L. INT'L. 257 (2011) (providing background and
discussion about the Act's transnational effect).
4. Criminal Code Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, ch. 77, pt.3, ch.12, § 98A (1990),
available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/Criminal%20Code%20Act-Partlll-IV.htm#Part 3.
5. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 2; see Bribery Act, supra note 3; see Laws of
the Federation of Nigeria, supra note 4.
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-28.1100 (1999).B;
48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (a corporation could be debarred from doing business with the U.S.
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the corrupt payment (200 percent in the U.S.7 and 500 percent in Nigerias),
plus $72 5,000,9 plus 400 percent of the harm caused,1o and require forfeiture
of any property that is the subject matter of, or used in, the commission of
the offense." The sentence in Nigeria of "not less than five times the sum of
the value of the gratification which is the subject matter of the offence where
such gratification is capable of being valued or is of a pecuniary nature"12 for
bribery of a public official reads as mandatory and does not appear to be
subject to reduction.13 The company can hope to escape penalty in all three
jurisdictions by avoiding detection, or can reduce the U.S. and U.K.
penalties according to a number of variables, some of which the corporation
controls.
III. The Company Cannot Reasonably Plan to Avoid Detection
The U.S. considers the prosecution of corporate crime a high priority.4
The average number of companies prosecuted under the FCPA has
Government); additionally, the World Bank has a two-tiered review and debarment process.
Export privileges may be curtailed or eliminated. Sanctions System, Overview, WORLD BANK
GROUP, (2013), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGAN
IZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,contentMDK:21419040-menuPK:3601079-
pagePK:64168445-piPK:64168309-theSitePK:3601046,00.html; see also 22 U.S.C. § 277 8 (g)
(1), (g)(3), 22 C.F.R. § 120.1; 22 C.F.R. § 127.7.
7. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (allowing for fines of up to $25M against corporations); see also
The Alternative Fines Act, 18 USC § 3571(d) (allowing fines against a company of up to 200%
of the benefit obtained by the corrupt payment).
8. Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act (2000) § 20 (Nigeria), http://
www.nigeria-law.org/Corrupt%20Practices%20and%20other%20Related%200ffences%20
Act%202000.htm; see also the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (2015) Cap. (32), § 319
(Nigeria), http://www.justice.gov.ng/documents/Criminal%20Justice.pdf.
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u.
10. U.K. SENTENCING COUNCIL, FRAUD, BRIBERY AND MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES:
DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE, 48-53 (2014). Harm is calculated differently, depending on the type of
case. In fraud cases, harm is the "actual or intended gross gain to the offender." Id. at 49. In
cases of bribery, harm is either the gross profit from the ill-rewarded contract or the cost
avoided by failing to enact appropriate measures to prevent bribery. Id. In cases where the
actual or intended gain cannot be established, harm is defined as "the amount that the court
considers was likely to be achieved in all the circumstances." Id.
11. Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act (2000) § 47 (Nigeria), available at http:/
/www.nigeria-law.org/Corrupt%20Practices%20and
%20other%20Related%200ffences%2OAct%202000.htm; see also Administration of Criminal
Justice Act (2015) Cap. (34), § 333 (Nigeria), available at http://www.justice.gov.ng/documents/
Criminal%20Justice.pdf.
12. Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000, § 20 (Nig.).
13. The Nigerian Law Reform Committee recently has developed its Sentencing Guideline
on Corruption and Related Offences 2015, which may provide more clarity in the future. See,
e.g., U.N., Office on Drugs and Crime, Brussels Liaison Office (2016), https://www.unodc.org/
brussels/en/anti-corruption-in-nigeria.html.
14. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-28.100 (1999);
Memorandum from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing to all U.S. Attorneys, (Sep. 9, 2015), https://
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increased from two per year between 1998 and 2006 to thirteen per year
since.5 The size of the penalties is increasing, too. The ten largest FCPA
enforcement actions have occurred since 2008.16 Since passing the FCPA in
1977 in response to admitted corruption of over 400 companies, the U.S.
remains the global leader in anti-corruption enforcement.'7 The U.S. has
initiated almost seventy-five percent of all international bribery enforcement
actions since 1977.18 While discovery is not inevitable-corruption costs the
global economy about $2.6 trillion annually in spite of these extraordinary
enforcement effortsl9-now is the most difficult time in history, and the
U.S. is the most difficult country in the world, to avoid detection after
engaging in corruption.
In light of these facts, the CEO should assume that the corrupt act will be
discovered and immediately seek to mitigate any likely punishment-
independent of a decision of whether to disclose. A good first step will be to
examine the company's internal controls. A strong system of internal
controls will reduce fines in both the U.K. and U.S.20 Because one element
of a strong system of controls is internal remediation, the CEO should
undertake immediate compliance process improvements, should initiate
adverse administrative action against the British agent, and should repay any
ill-gotten gains, if possible.
IV. Voluntary Disclosure May Reduce Penalties
States have emphasized-and given significant attention to-whether
corporations choose to voluntarily disclose misconduct and cooperate with
www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download ("fighting corporate fraud and other misconduct is
a top priority of the Department of Justice.").
15. Joseph W. Yockey, Using Form to Counter Corruption: The Promise of the Public Benefit
Corporation, 49 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 623, 627 (2015).
16. Richard L. Cassin, Here's our new Top Ten list, with VimpelCom landing in sixth, FCPA BLOG
(Feb. 19, 2016, 9:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/2/19/heres-our-new-top-ten-
list-with-vimpelcom-landing-sixth.html.
17. FCPA. See also S. REP. No. 95-114, 3-4, available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/senaterpt-95-114.pdf; H.R. REP. No. 95-640, 4-5,
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/house
prt-95-640.pdf.
18. Yockey, supra note 15 at 627.
19. John Kerry, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks at the World Economic Forum, (Jan. 22, 2016),
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/01/251663.htm.
20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES A UIAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2015/2015-ussc-guidelines-manual (giving sentencing
credit for effective Compliance and Ethics programs); see also Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 §7(2)
(U.K.) (making it a defense to prove that a company "had in place adequate procedures designed
to prevent persons associated with [the company] from undertaking such conduct."); see also,
SENTENCING COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 50 (making efforts to put anti-bribery measures in
place a mitigating factor); see also LEGAL GUIDANCE, CORPORATE PROSECUTION l32(c)(Crown
Prosecution Services) ("The existence of a genuinely proactive and effective corporate
compliance programme."), http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a-to c/corporate-prosecutions/#a09.
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investigators. Self-reporting and cooperation weigh against prosecution in
both the U.S. and U.K.21 But voluntary disclosure does not guarantee that
officials will waive or defer prosecution, which complicates these policies.
U.S. policy states that "prosecution may be appropriate notwithstanding a
corporation's voluntary disclosure."22 To clarify, in 2012, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) jointly published "A Resource Guide to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act."23 Unfortunately, the public response to the guide
was one of disappointment and confusion.24 U.K. policy is similar to U.S.
policy; voluntary disclosure is weighed against other public policy factors,
and no one factor is prescribed a particular weight.25 So even if a company
discloses its corrupt act, a prosecutor may still seek conviction.
When a company faces prosecution and pleads guilty, or is tried and
convicted, U.S. and U.K. sentencing policies recognize cooperation as a
mitigating factor. In the U.K., the court reduces a sentence if the
"corporation co-operated with [the] investigation, made early admissions
and/or voluntarily reported."26 In the U.S., "self-reporting, cooperation,
and acceptance of responsibility" will result in a reduced sentence. 27
The DOJ has publicly touted the benefits of such disclosure and
cooperation. At a speech in 2014, an assistant attorney general described a
case where a cooperating corporation implicated two CEOs and an in-house
counsel and thereby avoided corporate prosecution.28 In the Alcoa World
21. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-28.700 (1999); see also
CORPORATE PROSECUTION, supra note 20, at ¶32(a) ("A genuinely proactive approach adopted
by the corporate management team when the offending is brought to their notice, involving
self-reporting and remedial actions, including the compensation of victims"), http://www.cps.
gov.uk/legal/a-to-c/corporate-prosecutions/#a09.
22. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-28.900.
23. CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND THE ENF'T DIv. OF THE U.S. SEC.
ExcH. COMI'N, A Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2012), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/fcpa-guidance.
24. See Yockeysupra, note 15 at n. 42,(citing e.g., Grant Thornton LLP, New FCPA Guidelines
Still Unclear to Many Executives (2013), http://www.grantthornton.com/-/media/content-page-
files/advisory/pdfs/2013/FIDS-2013-FCPA-Guidelines.ashx; Bruce Carton, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Pushes for Further FCPA Clarity and Reforms, COMPLIANCE WK. (Feb. 20, 2013), http:/
/www.complianceweek.com/blogs/enforcement-action/us-chamber-of-commerce-pushes-for-
further-fcpa-clarity-and-reforms#.VbMrcvmpdnk; Peter J. Henning, In Bribery Law, the
Watchword Is Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/11/1 5/in-bribery-law-the-watchword-is-uncertainty/; Samuel Rubenfeld, Joe Palazzolo &
C.M. Matthews, The Guidance: The FCPA Bar Reacts, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2012), http://blogs.
wsj.com/corruption-currents/2 012/11/14/the-guidance-the-fcpa-bar-reacts/.
25. THE CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS, § 4.11 (Crown Prosecution Service 2013), http://
www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code 2013 accessible english.pdf.
26. U.K. SENTENCING COUNCIL, FRAUD, BRIBERY AND MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES:
DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE, effective 1 October 2014, 48-53.
27. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g).
28. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at American Conference Institute's
31st International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2014), available
at http://tinyurl.com/njfnztr (referring to the PetroTiger cases), as cited in Grindler, Gary G.
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Alumina case, Alcoa avoided a possible $1 billion fine by cooperating with
investigators, pleading guilty to violating the FCPA and paying $384 million
in SEC and DOJ penalties.29 On the other end of the anecdotal spectrum,
the DOJ uses the BNP Paribas case as a cautionary tale. There, the
company paid an $8.9 billion settlement, which DOJ claims would have been
substantially lower if the corporation had fully cooperated.30 In another
case, the DOJ claimed that a company's failure to disclose misconduct
resulted in a fine of $772 million, which was more than triple what the DOJ
would otherwise have sought.31 The DOJ and SEC guidebook promotes
disclosure, too. It contains "background information about cases the Justice
Department and the [SEC] decided not to pursue because companies
promptly disclosed violations and took remedial action. This information
furthers the government's goal of enticing businesses to cooperate by
revealing information about violations rather than hoping to escape
notice. "32
Thus, despite uncertainty about how heavily the DOJ will weigh a
corporation's choice to disclose misconduct in favor of non-prosecution,
voluntary disclosure promises benefits for the corporation. But how much,
and what type of information must the company share? And how will that
information be used?
V. Disclosure Alone is Not Enough; Earning Sentencing Credit
Requires Substantial Cooperation
The minimum standard for cooperation in the U.S.is high: "In order for a
company to receive any consideration for cooperation under this section, the
company must identify all individuals involved in or responsible for the
misconduct at issue, regardless of their position, status or seniority, and
provide to the Department all facts relating to that misconduct."33 This
expansive definition can create challenges for a company. There is no
requirement to waive either the attorney-client or work-product privilege.
But deciding not to disclose a relevant fact because it is subject to a privilege,
is, for the corporation, deciding to forfeit sentencing credit.34
and Laura K. Bennett, True Cooperation: DOJ's 'Reshaped Conversation' and its
Consequences, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Summer 2015 at 39.
29. Grindler, True Cooperation, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 3 9-40 (discussing the
Alcoa case), quoting Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks at the 22nd Annual
Ethics and Compliance Conference (Oct. 1, 2014), available at http://tinyurl.com/q34uoq9.
30. Id. at 40-41.
31. Id. at 33 (discussing the Alstom case).
32. Henning, supra note 24.
33. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9.28.100; Sally Quillian
Yates, Deputy Attorney General of the United States, Memorandum: Individual Accountability for
Corporate Wrongdoing, Sept. 9, 2015, available at https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/
download ("fighting corporate fraud and other misconduct is a top priority of the Department
of Justice.")
34. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-29.720.
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In recent speeches, DOJ officials have clarified expectations. Mere
information sharing is not enough, the Department considers cooperative
only the companies that actively gather evidence against employees and
share it with authorities.35 Officials warn of "the severe consequences of
'guilty pleas and landmark monetary penalties' when a company is deemed
not to have properly cooperated."36 So great is the pressure of this standard
that some corporations have strained the limits of forcing an employee to
talk. In at least one case, a prosecutor used DOJ policy in violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and led the corporation-acting as a
government agent-to violate an employee's right against self-
incrimination. 3 That specific policy has been superseded, but substantial
pressures remain.38
The DOJ's high expectations of cooperation from corporations are not
bad per se. They do, however, beg the question of whether a company
choosing to cooperate to avoid prosecution or failing such avoidance to
reduce a criminal penalty, opens itself to other risks. Specifically, if the
company begins sharing large quantities of detailed information, how might
it be used? Is it possible that the price of avoiding prosecution in one state is
a large penalty in another?
VI. International Information Sharing Agreements Create a Risk
of Parallel or Successive Prosecutions for the Cooperating
Corporation
As of January 1, 2013, there were 247 bilateral agreements in force
between the U.S. and the U.K., and thirty-two bilateral treaties in force
35. Grindler, supra note 28, at 34 ("In a 2014 speech, DOJ Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Marshall L. Miller bluntly emphasized the need for companies to gather
evidence against their employees as the critical factor in determining whether they will receive
leniency in corporate criminal investigations.").
36. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks at New York University Law
School's Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (April 17, 2015), as cited in
Grindler, supra note 28, at 37.
37. See Grindler, supra note 28, at 3 3-36 for a thorough discussion of the case law, including
United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), where the corporation, though its
action, became a government agent and violated an employee's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.
38. The policy was known as "The Thompson Memorandum" because it was promulgated in
2003 by then-Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson. It was controversial enough that
Senator Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican, filed S. 30, the Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act, which would have outlawed completely some of the practices the Thompson
memo described. Immediately after the Bill was filed in 2006, the Deputy AG at that time, Paul
McNulty, issued a superseding memorandum that cancelled the more controversial provisions
of the Thompson Memo. For a discussion of the McNulty Memorandum and the reasons it
replaced the Thompson Memorandum, see Wilmer Hale, Department of Justice McNulty
Memo Curtails Controversial Portions of Thompson Memo-Legislation Introduced in the
Senate (Dec. 13, 2006), available at https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandNews
Detail.aspx?NewsPubld=94117.
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between Nigeria and the U.S.39 These 279 instruments include both U.S.-
Nigeria and U.S.-U.K. mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs). All three
countries are parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC), and the U.S. and U.K. are parties to the OECD's Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention). These instruments do not
contemplate how, or whether, a state that initiates an enforcement action
should consider, negotiate over, or coordinate regarding an enforcement
action in another state.40 They do contemplate broad information sharing
about suspected corruption. Consequently, inter-state promises to share
information undermine domestic incentives for voluntary corporate
disclosure of wrongdoing.
A. INFORMATION SHARING
UNCAC Chapter IV sets out a broad scope of international cooperation.4'
The opening paragraph of the chapter discourages states from limiting
cooperation to criminal proceedings. Countries agree to "consider assisting
each other in investigations of and proceedings in civil and administrative
matters relating to corruption."42 Article 46 envisions legal assistance to the
broadest degree possible, including "identifying or tracing proceeds of
crime, property, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes,"
as well as "identifying, freezing, and tracing proceeds of crime," and "the
recovery of assets."43 At the sixth session of the Conference of the State
Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption held in
November 2015, the States Parties adopted a resolution urging "parties that
are using settlement and other alternative legal mechanisms to resolve
corruption-related cases to work collaboratively with all relevant States
parties to enhance international cooperation, information-sharing and
recovery of proceeds of crime;" and "to proactively share information
without prior request so as to engage all the States parties concerned early in
the process, in accordance with article 46, paragraph 4, article 48, paragraph
1 (f), and article 56."44 The Convention itself reflects this notion of
39. U.S. DEP'T. ST, Treaties in Force, A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements
of the United States in Force on January 1, 2013, 214-15, 300-309, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/218912.pdf.
40. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, art. 37, T 5, 2349 U.N.T.S. 27 (2004) [hereinafter
UNCAC], requires one State to consider incentivizing cooperation in another State by mutually
agreeing on sentence mitigation, and Article 30, titled "Prosecution, adjudication and
sanctions," discusses broadly some sentencing principles (i.e. retribution and general
deterrence), but both provisions fall short of advocating for collective action.
41. Id. at 21-31.
42. Id. at 21.
43. Id. at 24.
44. United Nations Conventions Against Corruption/Conference of the States Parties to the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption Resolution 6/2, paras. 9-10, [hereinafter
UNCAC/COSP 6/2] available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP-
session6-resolutions.html#ftn7 (echoing the Conference's resolution 5/3 of 29 November
2013).
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proactive information sharing. In Article 38, the parties agree to take
measures to encourage their own public authorities, public officials, and
investigators to share information "on their own initiative, where there are
reasonable grounds to believe that"41 either Bribery of National Public
Officials, Bribery in the Private Sector, or Money Laundering has been
committed. These affirmative requirements force a corporation that
discloses misconduct to officials in one state to assume that their disclosures
are shared with officials in other states of jurisdiction.
The OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Officials in
International Business Transactions is a shorter and more narrowly tailored
agreement than the UNCAC. Nonetheless, the overarching information
sharing, legal assistance, and universal enforcement policies remain. Like
UNCAC, the OECD convention specifically envisions information sharing
in criminal and non-criminal matters.46 Article 3 requires each party to
ensure that "the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign public
official, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds,
are subject to seizure and confiscation or that monetary sanctions of
comparable effect are applicable," and requires each party to "consider the
imposition of additional civil or administrative sanctions."47 This language
suggests that states will independently enforce anti-corruption laws without
consideration for penalties levied in other states.48
The U.S. and Nigeria entered into a mutual legal assistance treaty
(MLAT) in 1989.49 The treaty is similar to other MLATs, and-though
more detailed-resembles the legal assistance provisions of the UNCAC and
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. This bilateral treaty covers assistance
in criminal proceedings, bail hearings, sentencing hearings, non-criminal
proceedings, matters where no criminal prosecution or investigation is
pending, and even in cases where the investigation in the requesting state
pertains to an act that is legal in the requested state.50 Article XI reinforces
45. UNCAC, supra note 40, art. 38, at 19.
46. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Convention on Combatting Bribery of
Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, art. 9 (2011).
47. Id. art. 3, paras. 3-4.
48. This is not to say that they may not grant such consideration, but that they did not agree
in the Convention to do so. Consequently, companies must look to the policy and practice of
each country to determine the likelihood of receiving credit for sanctions paid in another
country.
49. S. EXEC. REP. 106-24, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
NIGERIA (2000), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-106erpt24/html/CRPT-106erpt24.
htm.
50. Id. art. I, the analysis, which was "prepared by the Office of International Affairs, United
States Department of Justice, and the Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of
State, based upon the negotiating history," emphasizes that the parties chose broad terms
deliberately so the Treaty would include "other legal measures taken prior to the filing of formal
charges in either State and the full range of proceedings in a criminal case, includ[ing] such
matters as bail and sentencing hearings" and that proceedings covered by the treaty need not be
strictly criminal in nature ..... [So] the Treaty could be invoked in matters where no criminal
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this broad approach by insuring access to "records of the executive, judicial,
and legislative units at the federal, state, and local levels in either country"
and allowing each country to share nonpublic government information "to
the same extent and under the same conditions" as it would share internally
across agencies or departments.5' Information provided to the U.S.
government by a corporation would fall squarely into one or more of these
categories, whether or not U.S. prosecutors issued an indictment.
The U.S.-U.K. MLAT was signed in December 2004 and ratified by the
U.S. in September of 2008.52 Like the U.S.-Nigeria MLAT, the U.S.-U.K.
agreement is tailored to facilitate bilateral cooperation in criminal and non-
criminal matters, including taking testimony, finding people, conducting
searches, seizing evidence, and "identifying, tracing, freezing, seizing, and
forfeiting the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and assistance in
related proceedings."53 The remainder of the document matches the U.S.-
Nigeria MLAT closely, including the sweeping language about providing
access to records, the use of compulsory judicial process, the seizure of the
proceeds or profits of crime, and the collection of criminal fines.5 The U.K.
agreement goes further than the Nigeria agreement by including
requirements for each country, on request, promptly to identify whether a
suspect holds a bank account in either country.55
For the corporation, the key takeaways are that the terms of these
instruments are broad, and they require information sharing when crimes
are first suspected: before any enforcement or sentencing decisions are
finalized and before negotiations or settlement agreements are complete.
Article 49 encourages parties to conduct joint investigations under bilateral
or multilateral agreements (but makes no mention of joint enforcement or
joint sentencing agreements).56
B. SENTENCING PRINCIPLES
Article 37 of the UNCAC requires parties to:
Encourage persons who participate or who have participated in the
commission of an offence established in accordance with this
Convention to supply information useful to competent authorities for
prosecution or investigation is pending, such as a civil forfeiture proceeding involving assets
acquired through a criminal offense covered by the Treaty." Further, Article I "permits
assistance to be granted even if the conduct which is the subject of a request does not constitute
a crime under the laws of the Requested State."
51. Id. art. XI.
52. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, U.S.-U.K., Dec. 16, 2004, S. TREATY Doc. 109-13.
53. Id. art. 1, para. 2 (g).
54. Id. art. 8 ("Taking Testimony and Producing Evidence in the Territory of the Requested
Party"); id. art. 9 ("Records of Government Agencies"); id. art. 14 ("Search and Seizure"); id. art.
16 ("Assistance in Forfeiture Proceedings").
55. Id. art. 16 bis.
56. UNCAC, supra note 40, art. 49.
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investigative and evidentiary purposes and to provide factual, specific
help to competent authorities that may contribute to depriving
offenders of the proceeds of crime and to recovering such proceeds.57
Further, parties must consider mitigating the punishment of offenders, or
granting immunity to those who provide "substantial cooperation in the
investigation or prosecution" of offenses.58 Paragraph 5 requires one state to
consider providing for the possibility of mitigating punishment for a
defendant who cooperated in another state. It does not require or encourage
one state to give a defendant consideration for paying a fine, penalty, or
settlement in another state.
The U.S.-Nigeria MLAT and the U.S.-U.K. MLAT are silent with
respect to sentencing principles, while the OECD Convention offers only
broad concepts. 59
UNCAC focuses on disclosure and cooperation but remains silent
regarding sentence mitigation in one state based on cooperation in another.
This contrast suggests that states view enforcement as a collective
responsibility, but sentencing as a purely sovereign exercise.
C. Parallel or Successive Prosecution60
UNCAC Article 47 recognizes the possibility of parallel or successive
prosecutions by requiring parties to consider transferring criminal
proceedings where "such transfer is considered to be in the interest of the
proper administration of justice, in particular in cases where several
jurisdictions are involved, with a view to concentrating the prosecution."61
Articles 51-59 focus on asset recovery. 62 The Convention includes
provisions that promote the broadest possible cooperation on recovering
assets, to include seizing assets in one state for the benefit of an enforcement
action in another, and allowing state parties access to civil courts to seek
judgements and to bring to bear the power of a judicial enforcement order of
a judgment or penalty outstanding in another state.63
The OECD Convention implies coordinated enforcement actions by
contemplating a situation where two countries with jurisdiction will agree on
57. Id. art. 37.
58. Id.
59. OECD, supra note 46, at art. 3, para. 2 ("effective, proportionate and dissuasive" penalties
for bribery) & art. 8, para. 2 ("effective, proportionate and dissuasive" penalties for record-
keeping violations).
60. These prosecutions, particularly when they occur successively in multiple jurisdictions, are
called "carbon copy" prosecutions. This term was coined in the summer of 2011 by Andrew S.
Boutros at a presentation during which he discussed, among other topics, the case this paper's
hypothetical is based on. See Andrew S. Boutros & T. Markus Funk, "Carbon Copy" Prosecutions:
A Growing Anticorruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World, 2012 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 259 (2012).
61. G.A. Res. 58/4, at 39 (Oct. 31, 2003).
62. Id. at 42.
63. See generally id.
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where prosecution is most appropriate.64 But, no such deferral is envisioned
with respect to sanctions. Article 3 requires each party to take measures to
ensure that "the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign public
official, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds,
are subject to seizure and confiscation or that monetary sanctions of
comparable effect are applicable," and requires each party to "consider the
imposition of additional civil or administrative sanctions."65
While Article XVII of the U.S.-Nigeria MLAT leverages concurrent
jurisdiction to empower each state's efforts to seize the proceeds or profits of
crime committed in the other state, it is silent on coordinating enforcement
actions or concurrent prosecutions.66 The U.S.-U.K. MLAT is similar.67
Despite UNCAC and the OECD Convention's tacit recognition of both
the possibility of parallel or successive prosecutions and the value of a
collective approach to enforcement decisions, the absence of any measures in
the bilateral treaties should not inspire confidence in our hypothetical CEO.
Almost as if to counter the DOJ's anecdotes encouraging disclosure, equally
powerful anecdotes stand to warn of how international information sharing
can result in disproportionately large fines against corporations.68 The
TSKJ/Bonny Island prosecutions (on which this paper's hypothetical fact
pattern is loosely based) may be the most well-known.69 In that case, a
consortium of multinational corporations facing corruption charges forfeited
in fines, restitution, settlements, judgments, and seizures $1.5 billion in the
U.S., $126 million in Nigeria, about $10.8 million in the U.K., $22.7 million
to the African Development Bank, and over $28 million (in property
forfeitures and fines) in Italy.70 Another well-known set of cases is the
Panalpina World Transport cases. 71 There, Panalpina and five of its
subsidiaries paid bribes in Nigeria and several other jurisdictions.72 Like the
TSKJ consortium, the Panalpina corporations paid settlements in both the
U.S. and Nigeria ($230 million in the U.S. and $18.8 million in Nigeria).73
The specter of parallel or successive prosecutions remains real, and is not
limited to Nigeria.74
64. OECD, supra note 46, art. 4, para. 3.
65. Id.
66. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Nigeria, Romania,
South Africa, Ukraine and The Inter-American Convention On Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters with Related Protocol, Oct. 4, 2000, S. Exec. Rept. No. 106-24.
67. Treaty Between the United States of America and The United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, U.K.-U.S., Jan. 6, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 96-1202, 2.
68. See Holtmeier, supra note 1, at 498.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 498-99 (summarizing the case).
71. Id. at 498.
72. Id. at 499-500.
73. Id.
74. John Frangos, The Risk of Carbon Copy Prosecutions in Thailand, TILLEKE AND GIBBENS
INT'L LTD. (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.tilleke.com/resources/risk-carbon-copy-prosecutions-
thailand.
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Further complicating the dueling examples above are several cases where
prosecutors have reduced fines against corporations as a way of recognizing
fines paid in other states. In some of these instances, observers and
commentators believe that investigators and prosecutors worked together
closely from the early stages of the case through negotiating settlements,
which-in at least one case involving Siemens-spanned more than five
years and resulted in settlements with five countries and the World Bank.75
So how can the CEO weigh these disparate sets of individual cases? What
does the data say?
VII. The Empirical Data Suggest That Voluntary Disclosure
Does Not Reduce Penalties and That International
Information Sharing Increases Penalties
In 2014, two authors conducted a quantitative empirical analysis of all
FCPA anti-bribery enforcement actions from 2004 to 2011.76 In their
analysis, they considered a set of hypotheses relating to the correlation
between sentencing factors and the severity of enforcement actions.77
Ultimately, the study found that the DOJ and the SEC "impose greater
aggregate sanctions for home-violation country pairs where the home
country has a bilateral cooperation agreement with the SEC, a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the U.S., and stronger local anti-bribery
institutions."78 Similarly, "more egregious and extensive FCPA violations
correlate with greater penalties."79 These findings are in keeping with the
policy notions that in terms of severity, the punishment should fit the crime,
and with the idea that information sharing agreements and international
cooperation will ease the burden of extraterritorial evidence gathering. But
the analysis also found that "voluntary disclosure, as well as cooperation and
remediation, are not correlated with lower FCPA penalties."so And, that "at
the level of individual FCPA actions, . . . foreign regulators' activities
(investigations as well as sanctions) correlate with significantly higher and
not lower sanctions. The DOJ and SEC do not appear to temper their
FCPA sanctions to take into account foreign regulators."81 The authors
recognize that this could be a function of better evidence gathering through
cooperation, and that it would be true if parallel investigations occur only in
the most egregious cases. 82  Nonetheless, bilateral or multilateral
cooperation agreements-and the strong legal regimes they engender-
75. A full discussion of these cases, including the Siemens case, is found in Holtmeier, supra
note 1, at 503-07.
76. Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD 409, 410 (2014).
77. Id. at 411.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 426.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 440.
82. Choi & Davis, supra note 76, at 410.
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correlate with "disproportionately large sanctions" from those other
countries83
For our CEO, this is bad news. The U.K., U.S., and Nigeria share
bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements, which are correlated with
higher penalties.84 Because all three countries, as parties to UNCAC, have
committed to unrequested and proactive information sharing about even
suspicions of bribery, the company must assume that self-reporting will
precipitate involvement by regulators in all three states.85 While voluntary
disclosure is not correlated with higher penalties, it is not correlated with
lower penalties, either.86 Worse still, the involvement of foreign regulators,
which is guaranteed by corporate disclosure is correlated with "significantly
higher" sanctions.87 Thus, in light of the empirical evidence, voluntary
disclosure seems unwise in this case.
VIII. Conclusion: The Policy Implications of Uncertain
Corporate Sentencing Outcomes
For our hypothetical corporation, there is no clear solution. But, for
policymakers negotiating international agreements, there is a larger lesson.
The combined effects of strong, domestic anti-corruption laws and the
information sharing provisions of international agreements create
disincentives to corporate self-reporting. Reduced self-reporting is
counterproductive to the international anti-corruption effort to promote
"integrity, transparency and accountability," and hinders the goal of
prosecuting demand-side corruption and fighting grand corruption.88 The
solution, then, is to stabilize the international sentencing landscape for
corporations; but how? The answer is collective state action, and Resolution
6/2 of the sixth session of the Conference of the State Parties to the United
Nations Convention against Corruption held in November 2015 suggests a
way forward.89
Four specific points stand out in the Conference's Resolution. In the
Preamble, the Resolution refers to the use of settlements and administrative
remedies in cases of corruption and calls upon states "to give due
consideration to the involvement of the jurisdictions where the bribery
schemes originated or where foreign officials were bribed."90 This
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. UNCAC/COSP 6/2, supra note 44, which echoes the Conference's resolution 5/3 of 29
November 2013 [hereinafter]; see also UNCAC, supra note 40.
86. Choi & Davis, supra note 76, at 440.
87. Id.
88. UNCAC, supra note 40, art. 5, para. 1.
89. See Jay Holtmeier, supra note 1, at 498; see also UNCAC/COSP 6/2, supra note 44. For a
general discussion of the concept of collective action and its success in the private sector, see
Collective Action: Innovative Strategies to Prevent Corruption, (Mark Pieth, ed., Die Deutsche
Bibliothek, 2012).
90. UNCAC/COSP 6/2, supra note 44.
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paragraph-standing alone-does not say whether "consideration" means
monetary compensation (as part of the enforcing state's settlement),
additional information (perhaps of the type our hypothetical CEO fears will
follow voluntary disclosure), collaboration in reaching settlements, or a
collaborative approach to the entire enforcement life-cycle.91 The
remainder of the Resolution offers some clarification.
Paragraph 10 urges states to share information proactively, even in non-
criminal resolutions and paragraph 9 urges cooperation while reaching
settlements to further the goals of "international cooperation, information-
sharing and recovery of proceeds of crime."92 Once a judgment is entered,
paragraph 2 asks states to "allow or expand cooperation in the enforcement
of foreign confiscation judgments."93 Paragraph 6 is, perhaps, the most
predictive of how the Conference envisions future enforcement actions.94
There, the Intergovernmental Working Group on Asset Recovery is
directed to, among other things, collect information and analyze factors
"that influence the differences between the amounts realized in settlements
and other alternative legal mechanisms and the amounts returned to affected
States, with a view to considering the feasibility of developing guidelines to
facilitate a more coordinated and transparent approach for cooperation
among affected States parties and effective return."95
The U.S. has recently signaled a recognition of the need for greater
transparency in sentencing in the domestic context. The U.S. DOJ, in
September 2015, published a memorandum-now known as the Yates
memo-that indicated a preference for prosecuting individuals rather than
corporations.96 In April 2016, the DOJ published its FCPA Enforcement Plan
and Guidance, which signaled another step forward.97 The Guidance sought
to increase the behavior-modifying effects of both the threat of sanctions for
misconduct and the promise of sentence mitigation for voluntary
disclosure.98 It promises that the Department will add "additional agents
and prosecutors to investigate criminal activity. . . enhance[] cooperation
with foreign law enforcement authorities. . . [and] provide[] greater
transparency about what [DoJ] require[s] from companies seeking mitigation
credit. . . and what sort of credit those companies can receive."99 Reactions
91. U.N. Convention Against Corruption Conference of the States Parties to the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption Resolution 6/2, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP-session6-resolutions.html#ftn7.
92. Id. paras. 9, 10.
93. Id. para. 2.
94. Id. para. 6.
95. Id.
96. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., INDIVIDUAL
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE WRONGDOING (2015).
97. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE CRIMINAL DIviSION, MEMORANDUM: THE FRAUD SECTION'S
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE (Apr. 5, 2016).
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id.
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to the Guidance were mixed, and more data is needed for a full assessment.00
Nonetheless, this progress in the U.S. domestic enforcement context only
further underscores the need for an international solution.
In order to leverage states' incentives for self-reporting in service of
international anti-corruption policy goals, the international community
should first agree on a set of anti-corruption sentencing principles, which
could be contained in the guidelines that United Nations' Asset Recovery
Working Group will craft.ioi These principles should answer important
questions for corporations. Should restitution be the primary goal of
enforcement actions against corporations, or is retribution equally as
important? Should penalties be higher against corporations that commit
corrupt acts in developing countries, or against companies whose home
states have strong anti-corruption laws? Is influencing corporate behavior a
higher or lower priority than punishing individual wrongdoers? The
answers to these questions-and others-would then shape future bilateral
and multilateral instruments, and would encourage the development of
specific mechanisms allowing for anti-corruption coordination from the
investigative phase through sentencing. These more specific agreements
could address questions of whether countries would focus prosecution in one
state but share settlements, or whether they would coordinate in negotiating
settlements with corporations to require payments in proportion to the harm
caused in each state. They could also wrestle with issues of grand corruption
100. Charles Duross, James Kouklos, Amanda Aikman & Lauren Navarro, DO]'s New FCPA
Pilot Program Will Have Only Marginal Impact, LAw360 (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.law360.com/
articles/781113/doj-s-new-fcpa-pilot-program-will-have-only-marginal-impact ("the DOJ's
need to build flexibility into the pilot program limits its ability to provide the greater certainty
that the business community wants". . . "there is not much that is new in the guidance". . . "the
current pilot program will likely only have a marginal overall impact on a given company's
overall approach to voluntary disclosure."); see also Brian F. Saulnier et al., The First 90 Days of
DO]'s FCPA Pilot Program, LAw360 (July 11, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/815464/
the-first-90-days-of-doj -s-fcpa-pilot-program. ("Although uncertainties remain that may
prevent the pilot program from meaningfully influencing corporate decision-making in the
short term, initial observations demonstrate a real commitment to decreasing the length and
burden of FCPA investigations and equipping corporate boards with a road map for efficient
FCPA compliance programs.").
101. This approach departs from the fully state-centric system that has operated since the
Westphalia Agreement. That is not to say that I advocate for a post-nationalistic system.
Instead, I envision an agreement that paves the way for states to create mechanisms that better
serve a set of agreed-upon principles. Specifically, the information sharing agreements could
serve as tools that would allow states to share or withhold information in proportion to another
state's adherence with or divergence from these same principles. The U.S. government, for its
part, has recognized that transnational influences will strain the state system, and specifically
envisioned a possible future "in which nation-states are not in charge of setting the international
agenda. The dispersion of power and authority away from nation-states has fostered the growth
of sub-national and transnational entities including social and political movements. Growing
public concerns about environmental degradation and government inaction come together ...
to 'empower' a network of political activists to wrest control of the issue out of country-level
officials in capitals." U.S. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNSEL, NIC 2008-003, Global Trends
2025: A Transformed World, 89 (2008) (emphasis added to chs. 6-7).
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and specifically decide whether one state could condition its information
sharing on the demand-country's willingness to prosecute its own corrupt
officials.
By agreeing on sentencing principles and including specific provisions
governing coordination in international instruments, pursuing and enforcing
transnational corporate corruption becomes a tool states can use collectively
to fulfill their obligations under UNCAC and similar multilateral
instruments and to empower them in the global anti-corruption fight.
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